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Tackling climate change and building a 
‘European energy community’ are among the 
most important challenges of the EU in the 
forthcoming years. As such, they clearly 
represent an important stake of the EU’s new 
leaders as they take charge following the 2014 
elections to the European Parliament.  
So far, the EU is the only significant region of 
the world that has really tried to integrate its 
energy and climate policies. In 2009, it agreed 
upon the 2020 Climate and Energy package, 
which resulted in the so-called 20-20-20 targets 
on carbon emissions, renewable energy and 
energy efficiency. Building on the lessons learnt 
from the 2020 framework, the EU is now 
thinking about the next package post-2020. On 
22 January 2014, the European Commission 
released the proposal on the 2030 framework 
for Climate and Energy Policies, which was 
discussed at the 20-21 March 2014 European 
Council. Together with the Council of Ministers, 
it will be the task of the new European 
Parliament to adopt it.  
The EU climate and energy policy area is based 
on a triangle of three objectives: the 
sustainability, security, and cost-competitiveness 
of energy supplies. When the 20-20-20 targets 
were adopted, climate change was clearly the 
primary focus of the EU strategy, while the 
more traditional goals of ensuring the security 
and affordability of energy supplies came in 
second line.  
Ensuring the sustainability, security 
and cost-competitiveness of energy 
supplies for the EU citizens are the 
main objectives of the EU climate and 
energy policy, which remains high on 
the EU agenda. The next European 
legislature will have the difficult task to 
reconcile these different objectives into 
a comprehensive 2030 framework for 
climate and energy policies.  
 
Taking into account the changing 
energy dynamics, this paper analyses 
thus the state of play of these objectives 
today in order to better understand how 
the 2030 framework for climate and 
energy policies should be designed. 
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However, the past few years have revealed that 
the objective of sustainability versus the 
objectives of competitiveness and security of 
supply can be pushed aside by various factors, 
such as an economic and/or political crisis, the 
national development of renewable energy 
sources, the changing global energy landscape, 
the depletion of EU energy resources, and the 
lack of consensus for a global climate 
agreement. While many Member States are 
facing budgetary constraints, the energy prices 
for households and industry alike are on the rise. 
This is partly due to the increasing costs of 
energy imports but also to the costs of national 
measures related to the green transition. 
Competitiveness and affordability of energy 
costs are thus of increasing concern and the 
price-differential with countries such as the U.S. 
is widening. The new circumstances have thus 
brought competitiveness and to a lesser extent 
security of supply to the top of the triangle of 
the climate and energy policy.  
After analysing what has changed since the 
adoption of the last climate and energy package 
and the state of play of the three-objectives, this 
paper will examine whether the proposed 2030 
framework provides a good basis to face the 
challenge of ensuring affordable energy prices 
and industrial competitiveness, while responding 
to climate change and the increased energy 
dependency.  
I. MANY FACTORS HAVE CHANGED SINCE 
THE ADOPTION OF THE LAST 2020 
FRAMEWORK 
At the European and global levels, many factors 
have changed since the adoption of the 2020 
Climate and Energy Package in 2007-09. These 
changes are mainly the followings:  
 The economic and financial crisis has 
clearly contributed to decreasing carbon 
emissions through a reduction of industrial 
production but it has also greatly reduced the 
ability of the public and private sectors to 
invest in low-carbon technologies. A number 
of Member States are under huge budgetary 
constraints, particularly those subject to 
austerity policies.  
 The cornerstone of the EU’s decarbonising 
strategy, i.e. the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme, did not prove efficient at 
promoting low-carbon investment. Since 
2008, more carbon allowances have been 
issued each year than used, leading to a huge 
surplus of allowances in circulation. 
Consequently, carbon prices have collapsed. 
This surplus is mainly due to the economic 
recession, but also to an over allocation of 
offset credits1 in the EU ETS; other EU 
climate policies that contributed to increasing 
the supply of allowances by reducing carbon 
emissions; and some additional allowances 
from three exceptional sources2 that have 
emerged on the market in 2012-2013. 
Overall, this surplus is expected to amount to 
more than 1.5 billion allowances. It is thus 
already clear that carbon prices will stay low 
in the forthcoming years, delaying the 
necessary low-carbon investment.  
 The development of national policies in 
response to the economic crisis, the low 
carbon prices, and the development of 
intermittent renewable energy sources, is 
fragmenting the market. The completion of 
the internal energy market, and the ‘cost-
efficient’ European solutions it is supposed 
to bring, could even be threatened.  
 The changing global energy landscape 
has important implications in terms of 
economic competitiveness, security of supply 
and sustainability. These new energy 
dynamics include, among others: the 
development of unconventional oil and gas 
in the US, the discoveries of new 
hydrocarbon reserves in Africa, Azerbaijan 
and elsewhere, the consequences of the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster, the impact of the 
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recent Russian actions in Ukraine and the 
shift towards renewable energy sources, 
particularly in the EU. In response to these 
changes, major disparities in energy prices 
among countries and regions have emerged, 
sparking a debate about the role of energy in 
international competitiveness. For instance, 
gas price in the US is three times less 
expensive than in the EU and five times 
lower than in Japan. In terms of security of 
supply, the International Energy Agency is 
also warning that international energy 
demand, spurred by economic growth in 
emerging countries (particularly China, India 
and the Middle East), will increase by more 
than one-third by 2035, thereby increasing 
competition for energy sources. Globally, 
fossil fuels will continue to meet a prevailing 
share of global energy demand, increasing 
global emissions and delaying the necessary 
shift towards a sustainable global economy.  
 The expectations in terms of global climate 
governance have changed since the Climate 
and Energy Package has been negotiated in 
2007-09. Both a global climate change 
agreement and a global carbon market were 
expected to arise, but neither of these has yet 
materialised. Since the Conference of the 
UNFCCC Parties held in Copenhagen in 
2009, new guidelines for the negotiation of 
an international agreement have replaced the 
old international regime. While the Kyoto 
Protocol adopted in 1997 was based on a 
“top-down” determination of legally-binding 
emission reduction objectives for developed 
countries and a global carbon market, the 
new system lies upon a “bottom-up” 
approach whereby all countries can make 
voluntary pledges, and on institutions in 
charge of organising an international 
solidarity in terms of finance, technology 
transfer and adaptation. It is under this new 
decentralised governance that a global 
climate agreement is expected to be reached 
in 2015 in Paris.  
Considering all these changes, it is clear that a 
new design adapted to the new situation is 
needed. It is essential for policymakers to be 
well aware of the dynamics underpinning the 
energy and climate developments in order to 
reconcile the three objectives of the climate and 
energy policy.  
II. STATE OF PLAY OF THE THREE 
OBJECTIVES 
The implementation of the 2020 Climate and 
Energy Package has showed that it is not easy to 
strike the right balance between 
competitiveness, security of supply and 
sustainability, particularly in a period of 
economic crisis. The different national policies 
supporting the European climate objectives 
have created increasing problems related to 
energy prices and security of supply within 
energy markets.  
Sustainability 
The 2020 Package was clearly oriented towards 
sustainability with its 20-20-20 targets, including 
a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
from 1990 levels; a raise of the share of 
renewables to 20%; and a 20% improvement in 
energy efficiency. However, if climate objectives 
are European, each country is responsible for its 
energy mix, its security of supply and its energy 
transition policies, making the coordination 
among member States in the achievement of 
these European objectives difficult. 
The EU is on track to meet its objective of 20% 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, it was greatly helped by the economic 
crisis and the resulting decrease in industrial 
production. Consequently, the huge surplus of 
allowances mentioned above has prevented the 
EU ETS to deliver the right price signal for 
investments in low-carbon technologies. 
Abatement efforts in the EU are thus expected 
to remain limited relative to the emissions 
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reduction resulting from the economic crisis. In 
2011-2012, carbon emission have even increased 
rather than decreased in some Member States. 
Concerned with the lack of incentive to invest in 
low-carbon technologies and hence the risk of 
“carbon lock-in”, several Member States have 
taken, or are considering taking additional 
national measures to complement the EU ETS.3 
However, these national measures are 
undermining the cost-effectiveness of the EU 
ETS across sectors and countries. The weakened 
ETS could thus encourage the adoption of more 
national measures, creating a vicious circle that 
would lead to the fragmentation of the single 
carbon market and the end of the level playing 
field it was meant to create. Although we are on 
the trend to achieve the 20% emissions 
reduction target, serious progress must thus be 
made in order to restore the credibility of the 
EU ETS as an instrument to promote low-
carbon technologies in the long-term.  
With respect to the renewable target, the EU 
annual energy consumption of renewable energy 
sources reached 13% in 2013. It is expected that 
the 20% target will be met, but access to finance 
will clearly be difficult. The raise of renewable 
energy sources in the system requires dealing 
with two important challenges. Firstly, 
renewable energy sources are still expensive and 
should become more cost-efficient over-time. 
However, although the costs of technologies like 
on-shore wind and solar are coming down, it is 
expected that most renewable energy sources 
will not be cost-competitive before 2025. The 
share of higher-cost renewable energy sources 
will thus continue to grow in the national energy 
mixes, as Member States will have to meet their 
2020 national renewable energy targets. 
Accordingly, governments prefer continuing to 
promote investment via different national 
incentive regimes, although they contribute to 
fragmenting the market and increasing power 
costs. Secondly, the intermittent nature of wind 
and solar power cannot strategically deal with 
demand peaks. Maintaining a match between 
supply and demand is thus increasingly complex 
in the EU electricity markets. This issue of 
generation adequacy is forcing governments into 
developing national back-up capacity schemes 
for renewables. Ultimately, the lack of 
coordination among Member States with respect 
to these national support schemes for 
renewables and back-up capacity is problematic 
and could endanger the very construction of an 
EU internal energy market. Moreover, over-
generous support schemes, which do not seek 
the best return on investment, increase prices 
for consumers and reduce the EU’s 
competitiveness. 
As for the 20% improvement in energy 
efficiency (compared to 2005 levels), it is very 
likely that this non-legally binding target will not 
be met. Before the adoption of the Energy 
Efficiency Directive in 2012, it was expected to 
achieve only a 10% saving of the EU’s primary 
energy consumption. Now, if all measures are 
correctly implemented by Member States, 
calculations show that we will probably reach a 
17% saving. This comprehensive legislative 
framework (with indicative national targets but 
obligations to achieve certain amounts of energy 
savings) has thus provided a real boost. 
Nevertheless, there is still an enormous 
untapped potential in the EU that needs to be 
developed, particularly in buildings, transport 
and industry. As often mentioned, the most 
environment friendly energy unit is the one 
which is not spent. 
Ultimately and ironically, Member States often 
intervene into the market in order to correct the 
market failures associated with the costs of 
climate change policies at a time where public 
policies and regulations are required to pull back 
from the market in order to let it work 
effectively. The problem is that if these 
interventions are not harmonised between 
Member States, they risk fragmenting the market 
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even more, leading to a slide backwards towards 
renationalisation of the climate and energy 
policies. 
Security of supply 
The EU is facing important challenges linked to 
its security of supply both outside and inside its 
borders.  
Externally, Europe is in a vulnerable position, 
due to its significant dependency on imported 
energy. While in 2007, the EU already imported 
53% of its energy consumption with natural gas 
representing 60% of these external needs, its 
energy import dependency should reach 59% in 
2030 with natural gas dependency accounting 
for 83%.4 Moreover, the EU’s primary energy 
supplies are often concentrated among relatively 
few partners. In 2010, about three quarters of 
gas imports came from Russia (35%), Norway 
(27%) and Algeria (14%). Russia also remains 
the main supplier of crude oil (34.5 % in 2010) 
and has recently become the principal supplier 
of hard coal (27.1 % in 2010).5 In view of the 
last developments in Ukraine and the Russian 
illegal annexation of Crimea, it is clear that the 
EU cannot continue to rely so much on an 
energy supplier, which is known to use energy as 
a political bargain chip. However, although their 
import volumes remain relatively small, there is 
some evidence of new partner countries 
emerging, such as Qatar and Libya for natural 
gas and Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan for crude 
oil. Besides, the discoveries of new producers in 
Africa and Latin America; the development of 
shale gas; the new supply routes thanks to, 
among others, the Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) 
and the new Southern gas corridor; as well as 
the technological progress are various new 
factors that should help the EU to diversify and 
secure its energy supply.  
Internally, the development of renewable energy 
sources has increased Member States’ fear about 
their long-term security of supply. The major 
challenge of renewables is to manage their 
intermittency. When the sun is not shining or 
the wind is not blowing, it is very difficult to 
maintain a match between supply and demand. 
Back-up generation capacities such as gas or 
coal power plants are thus necessary to quickly 
respond to these variations. However, 
investments in flexible conventional power 
plants as gas become increasingly risky. As 
renewables beneficiate from a priority dispatch 
and access on the network, some very efficient 
conventional power plants operate far behind 
the necessary amount of hours to be profitable 
and are unable to recover their costs. Many gas 
power plants have been forced to shut down, 
making coal the most profitable energy sources 
in the EU today. Therefore, some countries 
have decided or are planning to support 
electricity producers for developing national 
back-up capacity schemes. The irony of the 
situation is that consumers end-up paying twice 
for renewables and back-up conventional power 
plants in order to ensure sufficient flexibility is 
available. 
When security of supply is at stake, Member 
States tend to think nationally. However, 
according to the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity 
(ENTSO-E), the EU has adequate generation 
capacity for the next 10 years, even if the 
flexibility of this generation capacity is not 
guaranteed. For instance, in Bulgaria, violent 
protests against high power prices occurred in 
February 2013. Yet, Bulgaria is able to produce 
much more than its national demand. This high 
supply capacity should normally positively affect 
price level. However, various factors contribute 
to unsustainable energy prices such as privileges 
accorded to some State-owned energy utilities, 
the rapid development of renewables at high 
feed-in tariffs and the high preferential tariffs 
paid to “cogeneration” plants. In order to 
reduce its power prices, Bulgaria could use 
retained excess capacity to create competition, 
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including export to its neighbouring countries. 
However, the neighbouring countries face 
similar challenge and the Internal Energy Market 
regulation is not fully in place. This leads to 
counterproductive allocations of available 
generation assets as cheap power plants in one 
country might have to be switched off while 
more expensive power plants in well-connected 
neighbouring countries are still running. 
The full integration of Europe’s electricity 
networks is thus essential to reducing the 
intermittency problem of renewable energy 
sources but also to ensure cost-efficient energy 
supplies, guarantee energy savings and allow 
individual foreign supplies to be replaced when 
possible. However, the development of 
interconnections is hampered by national 
political and economic considerations, as well as 
difficult public acceptance. Therefore, 
interconnections take time to build. Cross-
border transmissions can take up to 10 years to 
gain planning permission and to get built, while 
the installation of some renewable can take a 
matter of months. If the development of 
interconnection does not meet the growth of 
renewable energy sources, volatility of electricity 
prices could increase. An efficient European 
grid infrastructure transporting wind power 
from the North and sun power from the South 
would greatly reduce the costs of renewable 
integration.  
If the integration of the European networks is 
not significantly upgraded in the near future, the 
national development of renewable energy will 
not bring many benefits, as Member States will 
have no other choice than to develop national 
back-up fossil fuel capacity in order to deal with 
the intermittency of renewables. This would not 
only increase the energy bills of consumers but 
also prevent the energy transition towards a low-
carbon economy with all the opportunities that 
the latter could bring in terms of growth. If not 
well-designed and coordinated at the EU level, 
these short-term national measures could thus 
spoil the whole long-term EU project. 
Competitiveness – energy prices 
The last main objective of the EU energy and 
climate policy is to ensure that it does not 
undermine the competitiveness of the EU 
economy. However, concerns over high-energy 
prices have increasingly taken over climate 
concerns. Many Member States and industrial 
actors fear that a strong energy and climate 
policy will have a bad impact on their 
economies.  
In order not to distort EU competitiveness, 
energy prices must not only be internationally 
competitive but also be affordable for final 
consumers. Yet, energy prices for households 
and industry have increased significantly in 
Europe these last couple of years. Between 2005 
and 2011, average electricity prices for 
households and industries have increased by 
29% in the EU, while they have grown by only 
5% in the USA and by 1% in Japan. Moreover, 
the EU’s industrial electricity price is currently 
twice higher than in the US – which benefits 
from its shale gas boom – and 20% higher than 
in China – and these price-differentials are 
widening. However, these are average figures 
that hide a very diverse picture across the EU, as 
energy prices in different Member States can 
vary by a factor of about 3-4.  
According to the “energy prices and costs 
report” released by the Commission in January 
2014, while retail energy prices have increased 
significantly during the period 2008-2012, 
wholesale electricity prices have decreased by 
between 35% and 45% and wholesale gas prices 
have stayed the same despite some fluctuations. 
This is mainly due to the increased competition 
between electricity and/or gas companies, the 
development of liquid and transparent wholesale 
markets, the growth of renewables with low 
operating costs, and the fall in consumers’ 
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energy demand in many Member States due to 
the financial and economic crisis.  
However, retail energy prices have risen and are 
expected to continue to rise in the forthcoming 
years for the following reasons:  
 The taxes motivated by general fiscal 
considerations and levies justified by energy 
and climate policies have increased 
significantly these last years. This is 
particularly due to national support schemes 
for renewables. In 2011, the net support for 
the electricity produced with renewables in 
the EU reached about €37 billion and is 
expected to increase to about €50 billion by 
2020.6 However, these figures hide significant 
national differences in the relative shares and 
in absolute values of the tax and levy 
component of energy prices. For instance, 
Germany and Denmark currently have the 
highest electricity retail prices due to the 
important proportion of taxes and levies 
dedicated to the promotion of renewable 
energy sources. 
 Then, network costs have also largely 
contributed to the costs increase. Strategic 
interconnections, intelligent networks and 
smart grids are key elements to connecting a 
growing share of intermittent renewable 
energy sources to the electricity network and 
to ensuring the security and diversification of 
supply. According to the Commission’s 
Energy 2020 strategy, €210 billion are needed 
to upgrade Europe's gas and electricity grids 
between 2010 and 2020, with very little funds 
coming from the EU budget.  
 The regulated energy prices in some member 
states are also preventing the markets from 
working properly, creating high market 
concentration.  
 The cost of investments to replace and 
modernise the EU’s ageing power generation 
infrastructure to consumers. 
 The rise of energy imports within the EU 
combined with the high prices of basic 
energy commodities, particularly gas. Our 
dependence on fossil fuels costs us about 
€400 billion/year and creates price 
uncertainty. 
 Electricity and gas regulations is becoming 
increasingly stringent, imposing, among 
others things, new safety requirements, the 
use of emissions-reducing technologies 
and/or the closure of high-emission power 
plants. 
Competitiveness is also about preventing 
“carbon leakage”, i.e. the delocalisation of 
industry to regions with less carbon constraints. 
By making the EU industry pay for its carbon 
emissions via the EU ETS, the EU must be 
careful that the imbalance in carbon constraints 
between the EU and third countries does not 
become a source of carbon leakage. So far, the 
carbon prices have been too low to really impact 
on the competitiveness of the EU industry. 
However, for a small number of energy 
intensive sectors, the risk of carbon leakage 
could become very real in the future. For these 
European energy intensive companies, 
competing globally could represent a significant 
challenge, as carbon prices are expected to rise 
in the EU, the cap on the EU ETS allowances 
will become more stringent, industries at risk 
should receive less free allowances, while the 
economy is likely to recover. This risk is even 
more actual that the main EU competitor – the 
US – is benefitting from comparatively low 
energy prices for its industry.  
To conclude, the competitiveness of the EU 
economy will remain an important issue in the 
upcoming years. While one can witness that the 
financing of climate policies is becoming less 
reliant on public support, the use of private 
funds from households or businesses to finance 
the energy transition poses a dilemma related to 
competitiveness. If households pay via taxes and 
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subsidies, retail energy prices will increase, 
stressing the issue of energy poverty which 
already concerns between 50 and 125 million 
people in Europe (mainly in Eastern and 
Southern Europe).7 If businesses pay through 
higher carbon prices, as expected by most 
market analysts, this will also increase the 
carbon costs on the electricity prices, and hence 
increase the risk of carbon leakage.  
III. HOW TO REBALANCE THE THREE 
OBJECTIVES IN THE NEW 2030 
FRAMEWORK? 
On 22 January 2014, the European Commission 
released its proposal on the 2030 climate and 
energy framework. This proposal was 
accompanied by a report on energy prices and 
costs and a communication for a European 
Industrial Renaissance, showing the significance 
of industrial competitiveness on the EU’s 
agenda. Rebalancing energy and climate policies 
to ensure affordable energy prices, industrial 
competitiveness, security of supply and 
achievement of our climate and environmental 
objectives was thus one of the main issues 
discussed at the summit of the European 
Council on 20-21 March 2014.  
The most important lesson learned from the 
2020 package is that if we want an energy and 
climate policy in the EU, it has to be 
comprehensive, not simply linked to 
sustainability. The achievement of economic 
sustainability in terms of competitiveness and 
security of supply must also be taken into 
account. It has been witnessed that there are 
interactions between the instruments to meet 
the three objectives triangle (see graph here-
under). However, these interactions can be 
counter-productive and negatively affect the 
achievement of an objective. For instance, the 
overlapping scope with the ETS of the EU 
targets for energy efficiency and renewables has 
undermined the efficiency of the ETS. The 
challenge for the 2030 framework is therefore to 
design instruments and policies that will not be 
contradictory but at best mutually reinforcing 
with the achievement of the climate and energy 
objectives. 
 
This section will explain the current proposal on 
the 2030 framework and investigate whether it 
allows a mutual reconciliation of the three 
energy and climate objectives through the 
analysis of each of these objectives.  
Sustainability 
In terms of targets, the proposed 2030 
framework differs from the previous 2020 
package, as it gives the primacy to the emissions 
reduction target. By 2030, the EU must reduce 
its greenhouse gas emissions by 40% below the 
1990 level. This target would be met through 
binding national targets. Considering that 
commissioner Oettinger had pragmatically 
recommended a 35% reduction in order to 
preserve EU competitiveness, this target can be 
considered as a relatively prudent compromise. 
However, many environmentalists have 
criticised it for not being based on science, as it 
would give us a 50/50 chance of exceeding 2°C 
of global warming. We can thus wonder if it 
should not have been the role of the 
Commission to propose higher ambitions, rather 
than proposing directly an acceptable target for 
Member States. It is not even sure that Member 
States will accept this level of emissions 
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reduction, as this objective did not figure in the 
conclusions of the last European Council 
Summit in March. Taking into account the 
timeline for the conclusion of a global climate 
agreement at the UN Conference of Parties in 
Paris in 2015, the European Council conclusions 
have nevertheless confirmed that the EU will 
agree on its climate contribution at the latest by 
October 2014.  
The EU ETS will remain the cornerstone for 
reducing industrial emissions. Without a 
sustained carbon price, there will be no long-
term investment signal. In order to address the 
surplus of emission allowances and improve the 
scheme’s resilience to major shocks the 
Commission proposes to create a market 
stability reserve that would automatically adjust 
the supply of allowances to be auctioned.  
The proposed framework also suggests an EU-
wide binding renewable energy target of at least 
27%. The big difference with the 2020 
framework is that Member States have no more 
binding national targets. The objective is to 
leave flexibility for Member States to transform 
their energy system in a way that is adapted to 
national preferences and circumstances. 
However, it is not yet known how this EU-wide 
target would be enforced should the national 
contributions not be enough.  
Despite the importance of energy efficiency, no 
target has been set so far. Its role in the future 
framework should be defined in a review of the 
Energy Efficiency Directive due to be 
concluded by mid-2014. If the review shows 
that the non-binding energy savings target for 
2020 did not bring sufficient progress, a 
mandatory approach to set the 2030 target 
might be considered. As a no-regret option for 
Europe, energy efficiency measures must be 
incentivise, even if it could affect the efficiency 
of the EU ETS. If, on the contrary, the 2020 
non-binding target supported by the Energy 
Efficiency Directive shows sufficient progress, 
the flexible solution of a non-binding target 
should be preferred. It is already expected that a 
carbon emissions reduction target of 40% 
should lead to increase energy savings by at least 
25% by 2030. On the basis of the review, the 
best energy efficiency measures with respect to 
buildings, transport, industry, and product 
standards should also be selected. 
Although, the absence of national targets for 
renewables might affect investment decisions in 
this sector, one main emissions reduction target 
is a rather positive element of the proposal. It 
should incentivise investments in low-carbon 
and energy-efficient technologies, while helping 
to avoid the counter-productive mutual 
influence between the different targets and their 
instruments. It has been explained that in order 
to meet their national renewable targets by 2020, 
Member States have developed different 
unsustainable national support schemes, 
distorting the whole market and hampering the 
EU ETS’ efficiency. It is thus positive that the 
2030 framework provides flexibility for member 
states in how they deliver their commitments. 
This will hopefully result in more adequate 
instruments and policies across the EU.  
In the meanwhile, the European Commission 
should adopt new Guidelines on Environmental 
and Energy State Aid for the period 2014-2020 
before mid-2014. These guidelines include rules 
which could significantly limit EU Member 
States’ freedom to adopt and maintain national 
support schemes, while proposing common 
principles and specific compatibility 
requirements. Accordingly, national support 
schemes for renewables should be gradually 
adapted to the increasing penetration and 
decreasing costs of renewable technologies in 
the market.  
The flexibility of the new framework takes place 
in a new governance system based on national 
plans for competitive, secure and sustainable 
energy, which will be organised and assessed by 
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the Commission. The objective of these plans 
elaborated under a common approach is to 
ensure stronger investor certainty and enhance 
coherence at the EU level. Equity mechanisms 
to ensure a fair effort sharing between Member 
States will thus have to be developed. The 
challenge of this new governance will be to trust 
Member States, which will remain rightfully 
sovereign in their choice of energy mix and 
capacities, while imposing rules that guarantee 
that the 2030 targets are met in a cost-efficient 
and coordinated manner.  
Security of supply 
It has been explained that the challenge of 
ensuring EU security of supply is increasingly 
influenced by changing energy dynamics in the 
EU and worldwide. In order to respond to these 
changes, the EU must thus prepare itself both 
externally and internally.  
Externally, the EU should continue to diversify 
its energy supply sources by concluding various 
binding international agreements and energy 
partnerships with key producer and transit 
countries, while avoiding relationships that focus 
exclusively on supply. In this global new 
context, the EU and its Member States will only 
make themselves heard if they speak with a 
single voice abroad. Consequently, the EU 
should be in a position to question commercial 
deals at the national level when they do not align 
with Europe’s security of supply as a whole. 
Moreover, the EU needs to make a more 
systematic, structured and coherent use of the 
set of foreign policy instruments that contribute 
to the development and strengthening of the 
Union’s external relations in the field of energy 
(i.e. CFSP, trade agreements, development 
policy association treaties, European 
Neighbourhood policy, strategic partnership, 
etc.).  
Internally, the best way to improve the EU 
security of supply is to achieve the transition 
towards a low-carbon economy in the longer 
term and to complete the creation of an internal 
energy market in the short-medium term. 
Ultimately, the aim of the EU is to replace its 
significant reliance on external supply with 
energy savings and new indigenous energy 
sources, such as renewables, but also shale gas 
or nuclear. As long as environmental and safety 
considerations remain the first priority, new 
nuclear and shale gas resources should be 
considered by Member States. With respect to 
shale gas, it is unlikely that the indigenous 
resources in Europe will become a game 
changer like in the US. Nevertheless, a clear 
regulatory framework for its European 
development should be defined, all the more so 
as the EU is under pressure to become an 
example of shale gas exploitation elsewhere. 
Before that, the priority is to complete the 
internal energy market so that Member States 
can benefit from the most efficient use of 
production capacities. This requires managing 
the development of renewables through a 
flexible electricity system based on market 
principles and accompanied by European 
measures to develop large investments in 
strategic interconnections, storage facilities and 
smart grids that would allow better demand-side 
management.  
In this context, the issue of generation adequacy 
is one of the major challenges. The new 
Guidelines on Environmental and Energy State 
Aid for the period 2014-2020 that should be 
implemented before mid-2014 include rules on 
state aid to secure generation adequacy. 
Accordingly, back-up capacities for renewable 
energy would be supported only if additional 
energy infrastructure or alternative measures – 
such as a more responsive demand side or 
electricity storage – cannot address concerns 
about a sufficient flexible generation capacity. 
Moreover, such aid should not unduly favour 
national generation or particular technologies, in 
order to limit the risks of strong distortions of 
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competition and environmental harm. 
Ultimately, the best way to fix the issue of 
generation adequacy would be to fully integrate 
Europe’s energy networks with smart 
infrastructure in transmission and distribution. 
The upcoming guidelines should thus also 
include rules for assessing infrastructure 
support, particularly on projects improving 
cross-border energy flows and promoting 
infrastructure in less developed regions. 
Competitiveness 
Rebalancing energy and climate policies to tackle 
competitiveness is central in the new 2030 
framework. The climate and energy policies 
need to be designed pragmatically in the aim of 
not harming countries’ economic growth. 
According to the Commission, the climate and 
competitiveness challenges “are not 
contradictory, but mutually reinforcing”. The 
costs of the energy transition should be 
compensated by the benefits of the green 
economic growth, including new jobs, the 
reduction of the high import dependency costs, 
improved energy efficiency, the development 
and deployment of new technologies, as well as 
social and health benefits. However, this will 
require making the right political and investment 
decisions. All these decisions should be based 
on comprehensive examinations of the true 
costs and benefits of different energy sources, 
consumer products and transport modes all 
along the value chain. 
In the proposal of the Commission on the 2030 
framework, a set of key energy indicators for 
competitive, affordable and secure energy has 
been proposed to assess progress over time and 
to provide a factual basis for policy action as 
needed. For instance, these indicators should 
relate to energy price-differentials with major 
trading partners, supply diversification, reliance 
on indigenous energy sources, and 
interconnection capacity between member 
states. This will make it possible to assess if the 
three objectives are well balanced. 
In the meanwhile, the completion of the internal 
energy market remains the priority. The full 
implementation of the internal market legislation 
in order to develop and use more efficiently 
energy infrastructure as well as to increase 
competition in the market is crucial to keeping 
prices in check.  
As it is expected that energy prices will continue 
to rise in the forthcoming years, sustained 
efforts in mitigating these prices supported by 
the consumers are required. The European 
Council Summit of March 2014 recognises the 
necessity of these efforts, in particular through: 
the implementation of energy support schemes 
in line with the State aid guidelines and best 
practice guidance provided by the Commission; 
the fuller use of the electricity generation 
capacity available on the internal market rather 
than relying on national capacities alone; 
sustained investment in energy efficiency and 
demand-side management; the promotion of 
domestic resources rather than an expensive 
reliance on external supply; as well as increased 
competition on gas supply markets and 
renegotiation of gas contracts. With respect to 
this last aspect, the EU should supervise the 
renegotiation of long-term contracts for gas with 
foreign suppliers (especially Russia) in its aim of 
applying the same range of gas prices 
everywhere within the EU.  
Considering that carbon prices are expected to 
increase in the future, the EU ETS post-2020 
should continue to support energy intensive 
industrial sectors at risk of carbon leakage by 
evidence-based measures so as to ensure a 
global playing field. 
For the first time, the European energy and 
climate policy will benefit from an important 
financing of about €35 billion from the EU 
budget 2014-2020 in order to support research 
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and development, energy efficiency, renewables, 
as well as infrastructure for transport and 
storage.  
CONCLUSION 
The proposal of the Commission on the 2030 
energy and climate framework is a good start. 
Taking into account the new energy landscape, it 
tries to redesign climate and energy policies to 
turn them into true industrial growth drivers. It 
thus reconciles climate objectives with cost-
competitiveness, while keeping an important 
focus on security of supply. However, if the 
proposal provides direction, it does not provide 
the means yet. The next European term will 
thus have to translate this proposal into concrete 
measures to be implemented by Member States 
with the support of the industry and individual 
consumers. The challenge will be to design 
adequate measures that will not be contradictory 
but at best mutually reinforcing with the 
achievement of the climate and energy 
objectives. 
As all the difficulties related to the energy 
objectives triangle will not be overcome at once, 
the first priority of the EU’s new leaders will be 
to complete the internal energy market. This will 
require that the EU and its Member States 
improve their coordination in identifying and 
implementing clear priorities. Otherwise, the 
very construction of an EU internal energy 
market could be compromised by the 
fragmentation of countries’ energy sectors from 
each other.  
Finally, the EU should make all necessary efforts 
to conclude a global climate agreement at the 
21st UN Conference of Parties in Paris in 2015 if 
it wants to succeed in showing that sustainability 
and competitiveness are mutually 
complementary and not contradictory. 
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ENDNOTES
1 Additional credits from emission reductions that took place outside the EU. 
2 These three sources are: 1) Unused allowances from the national new entrants reserves of the 2nd phase (2007-
2012) ; 2) A fixed amount of allowances from the 3rd phase (2012-2020) new entrant reserves is sold to fund 
projects related to new green technologies; 3) A number of 3rd phase allowances have been auctioned in order to 
avoid the scarcity that was feared at the time the climate package was negotiated. 
3 For instance, a tax for carbon intensive fuels in ETS sectors or a national carbon floor price that is supposed to 
exceed the ETS carbon price.  
4 Eurostat, Energy production and imports, August 2012, available on 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports#Further_Eu
rostat_information  
5 Ibidem 
6 BusinessEurope, A competitive EU Energy and Climate Policy – BusinessEurope recommendations for a 2030 Framework 
for Energy and Climate policies, June 2013, p.7.  
7 D. Chérel, Study of Fuel Poverty in Europe, EPEE, April 2009, p. 1, available on: http://www.fuel-
poverty.org/files/WP7_D26-1_en.pdf 
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